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Theory of Mind and False Belief in Two-Year-Olds:
The Smiling Butterfly is Happy
Simone Forsberg




Theory of mind refers to the ability to conceive of the mental  lives that  underlie 
behavior — an ability that supports virtually all interpersonal interaction. The development 
of theory of mind has been attributed to various cognitive, social and environmental factors. 
The possession of theory of mind in toddlers has been a widely disputed topic, viewed as 
contingent on their understanding of false-belief as demonstrated in a standard false-belief 
task. However, recent studies suggest that the standard task may be a weak indicator for 
various  reasons.  It  may not  encompass  what  young children  are  truly  capable  of.  Some 
research shows that by adjusting the demands or context of the standard tasks, children have 
a better chance of succeeding  at them, thereby demonstrating aspects of theory of mind at a 
younger  age.  This  study  argues  that  naturalistic  observations  of  toddlers’ daily  behavior 
suggest  that  young  children  may  possess  an  awareness  of  mental  states  that  ranges  in 
availability depending on the context.
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I  have  often  wondered  about  these  moments  of  clarity  in  which  we  somehow 
understand,  without  explicit  knowledge,  the  intentions  of  other  people.  How  can  we 
persuade,  predict,  and  empathize;  how  can  we  infer  information  from  other  people’s 
behavior, react and simply make sense of it? The essence of my inquiry points at that which 
underlies virtually all social relationships however intimate or distant, and it revealed itself in 
this very exploration of the insights that human beings have into other people’s minds. The 
inquiry is a longstanding one that spans decades of investigation, analysis and theorization by 
philosophers and psychologists alike, piecing together the history of thought and philosophy 
of the mind.
It is our very conception of the mind, our own mind and therefore the distinct minds 
of others, that allows us to comprehend, explain and predict other people’s behavior. Without 
this  capacity  to  infer  other  people’s  reasonings,  notions  that  some of  us  might  take  for 
granted  like  understanding  social  cues  or  other  people’s  beliefs,  desires,  opinions  and 
intentions would be indecipherable. If we were to see someone frowning, we could assume 
the mental state sadness, disappointment or something of the like. We attribute meaning to 
the  action  of  frowning,  and  connect  it  to  an  inexplicit  emotional  state.  This  capacity  to 
apprehend the connection between someone’s behavior and their mental states is thanks to a 
possession of theory of mind. 
The term theory of mind is indicative of its definition. To have a theory of mind, in its 
most basic sense, is to possess the theory that human beings have mental existences and that 
these existences underlie behavior. With this comes the understanding that minds are unique 
and account  for  differences  in  belief,  desire,  hope,  fear  and the  like.  It  also  means  that 
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humans can share and adopt other perspectives, an ability that some believe to have arisen 
with the advent of thought (Matravers, 2017). 
More  recent  work  that  focuses  on  the  human  capacity  to  share  mental  states  is 
mirrored in Piaget’s earlier work on children’s perspective taking abilities and his ideas about 
egocentrism  (Doyle,  1987).  Piaget  suggested  that  very  young  children  appear  unable  to 
imagine a situation from another person’s point of view, that the way the child themselves 
experiences the world is also the way everyone else does. In exploration of these ideas, he 
developed tasks that tested a child’s awareness of spatial perspective, that is,  how things 
appear depending on where a person is located. Thus, these ideas were being explored long 
before the advent of the term in the late 1970’s by David Premack and Guy Woodruff in their 
research with chimpanzees (De Bruin, 2014), and certainly long before the burst of theory of 
mind research in the past two decades.
That humans possess theories of mind is not questionable. What is an area of inquiry 
and debate, however, is the nature of the existence of theory of mind in the youngest among 
us — children. What do infants and toddlers understand about other people’s minds? When 
do they really  start  to  think about  other  people’s  thoughts  and feelings? Do very young 
children have a theory of mind at all, and therefore how is theory of mind defined? Finally, 
how can we explore the answers to these questions and how have they been explored in the 
past? 
This body of work reviews some of the existing literature that seeks to decipher the 
answers  to  these  questions  within  the  infant  and  toddler  years.  The  reason  for  this  age 
limitation, other than the need to remain within the scope of this project, is for the sake of its 
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controversial nature and relatively recent area of study . In the past two decades, theory of 3
mind research has made significant connections between the social, cognitive and linguistic 
realms of child development. These domains have been used to explain the theory of mind 
phenomenon and the motors that drive its development. Therefore, the following discussion 
of theory of mind will explore definitions, functions, potential processes of acquisition and 
development through various theoretical lenses. Some of the research that has already been 
done to investigate these questions and ideas will be highlighted. This precedes the second 
portion of this thesis, which includes a task carried out with seven two-year-old students in 
the afternoon class in the Early Childhood Center.  The aim was to attempt to apply this 
verbal  task  to  the  two-and-a-half-year-old  child  and  to  explore  their  perspective  taking 
abilities in the particular context of this play-based school. Naturalistic observations follow 
the task discussions to further elucidate the nature of the children’s insights into mental states 
as well as their level of false-belief comprehension at this particular point in their lives.





An area of theory of mind research that has been considered to be integral to our 
understanding of it in young children is the ability to attribute false belief to another person. 
A test  that  determines  a  child’s  comprehension  of  false  belief  — a  false-belief  task  — 
requires the participating child to make a claim about another person’s mistaken belief. To 
attribute false belief is to understand (1) the difference between the subjective mind and the 
objective world, (2) that another person could have false knowledge about reality, and (3) 
that  another  person could have a  belief  different  from the child’s  own.  It  is  a  cognitive 
turning point at which time the child will theoretically display their particular conception of 
mind and reality and their ability to attribute meaning to mentalistic terms like ‘believe’ and 
‘think’ (Origgi, 2015). Indeed, success on false-belief tasks marks an important milestone in 
the development of theory of mind. As a result, some believe that it also marks the beginning 
of  a  coherent  theory  of  mind in  general,  that  it  is  the  point  at  which  children  begin  to 
understand that cognitive processes govern behavior. 
The classic false belief task, developed by Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983) 
involves a change in location of an object. The child watches a participant observe an object 
in a particular location. Then they watch the participant leave the scene. The object is then 
moved to another location and as the participant returns to the scene to look for the object, 
the child must answer where they predict the participant will look for the object. In theory, 
older children and adults will say that the participant will look for the object in the original 
location because they were not present when the object was moved, and the young child will 
 10
say that they will look in the new location. The reasons for why young children answer this 
way are precisely what this thesis explores. Other iterations of standard verbal false-belief 
tasks have grown out of this initial study, but all aim to measure the same type of awareness 
in the child. In order to succeed at the task, the child, who, as Piaget suggested, is prone to 
applying their beliefs to others, must restrain this urge and instead attribute a false belief (De 
Bruin, 2014).
Generally, false-belief tasks require the child to give a verbal response. This has been 
criticized as  one of  the  perceived limitations  of  the  standard tasks  (De Bruin,  2014).  In 
response to this potential limitation, other tasks have been developed to bypass the need for 
verbal  responses  and  thereby  make  it  applicable  to  younger  children  and  even  infants. 
Spontaneous-response false-belief tasks are an example of this. These tasks do not require 
verbal responses but rather rely on the child’s spontaneous behavior for information. This 
research,  for example,  measures and tries to make meaning of a child who gazes for an 
extended period of time at something that violated their expectation. Meaning is also deduced 
from tasks in which a child casts a seemingly anticipatory gaze at the location where another 
person will mistakenly look for an object that has actually been moved. 
An even more recent study suggests that false-belief tasks actually require a wide 
range of processing abilities any of which could make succeeding at the task difficult for a 
toddler (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016). By reducing processing demands, 30- and 33-
month-old children were more likely to succeed at  the task (Setoh,  Scott  & Baillargeon, 
2016). Young children’s inhibitory processes, that is, their ability to inhibit certain responses, 
are still immature, and their ability to tune out their own privileged knowledge is limited and 
takes  practice.  The  researchers  argue  that  the  standard  task  questions  trigger  “prepotent 
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responses” based on what the children themselves know (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016). 
As children’s inhibitory processes are limited, they do not suppress their initial responses 
when asked a standard task question about something they have some knowledge about. 
Despite the fact that this would otherwise be considered an unsuccessful task result, the child 
may well be able to express the knowledge of someone else if the processing demands were 
reduced. In other words, it is not that the child cannot express false-belief understanding, but 
rather that the child requires practice in expressing a response that conflicts with what the 
child  herself  knows.  The  researchers’ solution  was  to  allow  the  participants  to  practice 
engaging with the types of questions that would be asked in the test as well as the materials 
used.  The  researchers  asked participants  practice  questions  that  resembled  the  ones  they 
would be asked on the actual task. These practice trials were not opportunities to practice 
exercising  false-belief  understanding  but  rather  to  practice  answering  ‘where’ questions, 
choosing between two images presented, and anticipating when questions would be asked 
(i.e.  when the researcher presented two images) (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016). This 
procedure reduced the response-generation demands, and their results showed the effect. The 
majority of the 30 to 33-month-old participants succeeded at the task. Their results support 
the notion that theory of mind and false-belief understanding are both present in very young 
children:  “there  is  substantial  continuity  in  false-belief  understanding  from  infancy  to 
childhood” (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016, p. 13361). By adjusting the administration of 
the task, it became more accessible to the young child.
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2.2 Defining Theory of Mind
The term ‘theory of mind’ in an original sense refers to the basic human conception of 
mental states (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). When the term was coined and research into theory 
of  mind  became an  area  of  intense  inquiry,  the  methods  that  researchers  used  to  try  to 
identify theory of mind in children changed the way that we understood its existence. With 
the advent of false-belief tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), success on the task became 
akin  to  possession  of  theory  of  mind.  Hughes  and  Leekam refer  to  this  as  the  “narrow 
definition.” This definition also narrowed the research to children over the age of three or 
four, hence the dearth in research of theory of mind in young toddlers who generally do not 
succeed on false-belief tasks before that age (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). 
It  also  narrowed  the  definition  of  theory  of  mind  to  include  only  the  child’s 
representational understanding of the mind. This means that it excluded their understanding 
of  mental  states  like  intention  and emotion  (Hughes  & Leekam,  2004).  Meltzoff  (2000) 
distinguishes between two levels of mental understanding. The first he calls “mentalism,” 
which is the primary understanding that there are psychological states that operate under the 
surface  of  behavior.  The  second  form  is  a  representational  model  of  the  mind.  As  a 
“representationalist” the child understands that mental states are not simply replications of 
the world but rather unique interpretations of it depending on the individual. This mental 
state differentiation implies a sequential  development of theory of mind in which certain 
stages  or  levels  of  understanding  come  to  be  determined  by  what  precedes  them.  This, 
Meltzoff  suggests,  is  the  basis  for  the  theory  that  a  singular  theory  of  mind  may  not 
necessarily exist. It defies the notion that theory of mind does not exist at one moment in 
development and then exists in the next, as if a light were switched on. 
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This also suggests that children younger than four or five might be incorporated into 
the population of children possessing a theory of mind. “The experimental data that exist 
seem to suggest that even two-and-a-half- to three-year-olds are mentalists, they read below 
the surface behavior to understand the actions of persons” (Meltzoff, 2000, p. 152). This is 
exemplified in research that displays young children’s usage of belief and desire to explain 
human behavior, i.e ‘they want to use this toy!’ (Meltzoff, 2000). This has been confirmed in 
three-year-olds (Bartsch and Wellman, 1989), and anyone who has spent time with two-and-
a-half-year-olds knows that they too have the propensity, or at least the ability, to explain 
behavior in this way. This may be months or years before they might be able to succeed on a 
standard false-belief task. Perhaps there are several different “theories” or degrees of a theory 
that arise at different points in development as the child’s knowledge and understanding of 
the world evolve (Meltzoff, 2000). This is one possible explanation for the successful results 
of infants on tasks that do not require verbal explanations of mental states. Instead, these 
tasks seek to measure the child’s thought processes based on behavioral or mental indicators 
like gaze, joint attention, intention and sharing affective states (Stern, 1985). These are states 
that do not require language and that imply intersubjective awareness, that is, some kind of 
early interpersonal understanding of the mental states of others.
Young children’s abilities to recognize and respond to emotion are likewise an area of 
important  inquiry  and  seem to  precede  conceptions  of  the  mind,  thought  processes  and 
therefore false-belief comprehension. Dunn (1991) suggests that it is probable that emotional 
awareness is more readily available earlier on than the ability to conceptualize other people’s 
cognitive processes.  After  all,  young children,  even infants,  seem to be aware of  other’s 
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emotions  especially  those  close  to  them and  are  perhaps  even  empathetic  to  them (see: 
Gopnik, 2010).
A broader definition of theory of mind that includes insight beyond understanding of 
false  belief  expands  the  threshold  of  theory  of  mind  to  include  younger  children  —  a 
relatively novel demographic — and different degrees of awareness. In this way, a broader 
definition can allow for discrepancies between what a child can understand theoretically and 
what a child can actually perform in realtime. Based on her clinical work with people with 
autism , speech-language pathologist  Michelle Garcia Winner has observed that  what her 4
clients can understand about social interactions on an intellectual or theoretical level is not 
necessarily reflective of how they could act  in a situation requiring realtime social  input 
(Winner, 2014). She calls this Slow and Fast Theory of Mind. Although Winner is referring 
specifically to her clients, this certainly points us towards a much broader picture of theory of 
mind with a definition that encompasses a complex range of mental and social insight. 
Theoretical Perspectives
The ways in which researchers conceive of the roots of theory of mind are tightly 
bound to age and theories of development, and they are contingent on the definition of theory 
of mind that is being considered. What some might think of as origins of theory of mind, 
others might call contributors to theory of mind or the acquisition of theory of mind. This 
depends on the theoretical lens that is being used, that is, the actual structure of theory of 
mind that they believe in. Some lenses that are commonly applied include a modular point of 
 For the purposes and scope of the paper, theory of mind and autism specifically will not be 4
discussed, although the research on the relationships between the two is invaluable. 
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view, a folk psychology point of view, and a simulation point of view (Origgi, 2015; Saracho, 
2014b). 
The  modular  or  nativist  point  of  view  sees  theory  of  mind  as  having  an  innate 
cognitive framework (Saracho, 2014b) as if it were a module or mechanism waiting to be 
activated (Origgi, 2015). This theoretical tradition suggests that theory of mind has an “innate 
basis”  and  is  not  learned  or  acquired  (Saracho,  2014b).  Seen  in  the  light  of  a  modular 
perspective, theory of mind develops independently of other social, emotional or cognitive 
developments (Origgi, 2015) and therefore places little emphasis on social and environmental 
factors (Hughes & Leekam, 2004).
On  the  other  hand,  some  explain  theory  of  mind  as  a  folk  or  commonsense 
psychology.  This  theory  relies  on  a  common-sense  understanding  of  how human beings 
behave to give behavior ordinary meaning (Michlmayer,  2002; Saracho,  2014b).  Without 
scientific background, humans access theories of mind and behavior on their own, hence the 
use  of  the  word  ‘folk’ (Saracho,  2014b).  Thus,  seen  through  this  lens,  we  are  all  folk 
psychologists.  It  is  also a predecessor to the modern theory-theory (Saracho, 2014b) and 
explains the development of theory of mind as having a process similar to that of an evolving 
scientific theory. It begins as a “naive theory” that transforms and gets restructured with time, 
experience,  and causal  information (Origgi,  2015;  Saracho,  2014b).  Children are  akin  to 
scientists, using newfound data to inform their ever-evolving theories and conceptualizations 
of  the  world.  This  view takes  into  account  the  presence of  other  insightful  abilities  that 
children  have,  such  as  emotion  recognition,  desire  and  deception,  before  their  ability  to 
succeed on standard false-belief tasks (Origgi, 2015). 
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A third lens through which theory of mind can be viewed is through the simulation 
theory. Unlike the theory-theory, simulation theory suggests that mental insight depends not 
on a folk psychology but on an ability to simulate being ‘in another person’s shoes.’ In other 
words, rather than an implicit common-sense understanding of human behavior, one has the 
ability to pretend or create comparable states as if one were another person (Saracho 2014b). 
It  requires  one  to  imagine  themselves  in  another  person’s  state  and  then  extrapolate 
information based on what they imagine it would feel like to be that person (Michlmayer, 
2002; Origgi, 2015). This is related to, and even otherwise known as, empathy (Matravers 
2017; Michlmayr, 2002). 
It  is  likely  that  we  employ  a  combination  of  these  theories  in  social  interaction 
(Hodges and Myers, 2007). Furthermore, the operations utilized to recognize and interpret 
the internal states of others may change based on environmental factors or how much we 
know about the other person. This is true of both children and adults. 
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2.3 Functions of Theory of Mind 
Before venturing to consider the potential acquisition or development of theory of 
mind, it is valuable to consider what the functions of possessing a theory of mind are at all. 
Why is theory of mind an important socio-cognitive ability and in what way does it have 
implications for our daily lives and in virtually all interpersonal situations? The short answer 
is that it implicitly underlies human communication and shared social realities. It is “essential 
for human interaction” (Saracho, 2014a, p. 6). The understanding of mental states, our own 
and therefore those of others, is what allows us to distill information out of other people’s 
expressive behavior. 
As will be discussed below, the information we distill can be descriptive, predictive 
or interpretive. For example, I can “predict” that if I filled a cereal box with rice, my friend 
would be confused upon opening it. In the reverse order, we can also interpret a meaning 
behind someone’s body language, gestures, actions and facial expressions. If I see someone 
reaching across the table in the direction of the pepper, I can infer that this is what they are 
thinking about retrieving. I could be wrong, perhaps they are actually reaching for the butter 
that is right beside the pepper, but I can attribute a goal and a desire to them nonetheless. 
Both  abilities  are  thanks  to  this  insight  into  the  connection  between  mental  states  and 
expressive behavior. 
These seemingly banal examples are important to consider because they emphasize 
how often we might employ a theory of mind and how, for some people,  it  becomes as 
intuitive  as  breathing.  These  are  situations  that  arise  in  the  home,  in  the  workplace,  in 
restaurants,  in  a  strategic  game like  chess,  in  the  airport,  between  family  members  and 
between strangers, that is to say in virtually every social milieu. This interpersonal awareness 
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is not simply helpful: “Such insight is crucial to one’s well-being because it helps to make 
sense of what would otherwise be a very confusing social world” (Ruffman and Taumoepeau, 
2014, p. 45).
The instances in which theory of mind can be and is employed are innumerable, but 
they  can  be  categorized  into  three  main  functions  —  comprehension,  prediction  and 
manipulation — all  of  which require  someone to,  at  the  very least,  conceive of  another 
person’s perspective (Michlmayr, 2002). 
Comprehension:  At  its  most  basic  level,  theory  of  mind  is  a  tool  that  allows 
individuals  to  understand  the  behavior  of  others.  It  permits  us  to  interpret  daily 
behaviors by using mental states to explain those behaviors. It allows someone to 
understand what an individual’s goal is when she reaches into her bag and pulls a key 
out upon arriving at the door of her home or why a child cries when their ice cream 
falls to the ground. Simply put, theory of mind allows us to deduce why people do 
the things that they do. 
Although empathy is not included in Michlmayr’s original classification of the 
functions of theory of mind, it seems to me that its absence from the conversation 
leaves a noticeable gap. Empathy is categorized into two types of responses that can 
be  appropriately  nestled  in  comprehension.  Cognitive  empathy  refers  to  mental 
perspective-taking  and  the  ability  to  perceive  another’s  thoughts,  including  their 
feelings (Hodges and Myers, 2007; Smith, 2006). Cognitive empathy affords us the 
ability  to  recognize  thoughts  and  emotions  in  the  first  place.  In  doing  so,  we 
recognize that the internal states of others are not identical to our own. “Cognitive 
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empathy  is  intimately  linked  to  the  development  of  a  theory  of  mind,  that  is, 
understanding that someone else’s thoughts may differ from one’s own” (Hodges and 
Myers, 2007, p. 297). Moreover, the ability to recognize internal states sets the stage 
for  more  complex  interactions  like  interpretation,  prediction,  and  manipulation, 
which will be discussed more fully below. All are preceded by the basic recognition 
of  certain  mental  states,  which  cognitive  empathy  permits.  On  the  other  hand, 
affective  empathy  or  emotional  empathy  refers  to  the  “vicarious  sharing  of 
emotion” (Smith, 2006, p. 3). This encompasses emotional responses to others by 
way of  empathic  concern,  distress  and/or  care.  Exactly  how these  two empathic 
responses create the conditions for  comprehension is  debated,  but  it  is  clear  that 
empathy and theory of mind are tightly intertwined. 
Prediction: Predicting behavior is a more complex function of theory of mind and 
takes comprehension a bit further. The ability to anticipate behavior is part of what 
allows us  to  formulate  proper  responses  to  it  thereby allowing a  certain  flow in 
human communication or interaction. We may not be aware of it, but we anticipate 
behavior regularly. I think it is safe to say that we have all uttered something along 
the lines of: ‘I was not expecting them to say that’ or ‘I was caught off guard and 
didn’t know how to respond.’ However subliminally, we are constantly anticipating 
behavior from people based on our experiences in interpersonal situations, and we 
formulate our responses based on these expectations. When these expectations are 
defied, we are, as we say, ‘caught off guard.’ 
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Manipulation: The combination of interpretive and predictive abilities also allow 
individuals to use this mental-state intelligence to manipulate, persuade or generally 
influence behavior.  Theory of  mind can make information like  another’s  desires, 
beliefs, intentions and goals accessible. If, for example, I wanted my roommate to 
take out the trash without explicitly saying so, I might predict that putting something 
very odorous in it would compel them to do just that. This requires the understanding 
that this person would not like the odor coming from the trash as well as the ability 
to predict that because they do not appreciate the odor, they will want to get rid of it. 
Hopefully, if I predicted correctly, they will take out the trash. In this way, theory of 
mind is  directly  responsible  for  the  human ability  to  influence and control  other 
people’s behavior. Despite the modern connotations of ‘manipulative’ behavior, this 
function of  theory of  mind is  neither  inherently malevolent  or  benevolent,  rather 
powerful.
Taken  together,  these  functions  of  theory  of  mind  are  clearly  essential  in  social 
situations that are not explicitly narrated. Take the example of the key again: one would not 
necessarily say ‘I am reaching into my bag to get my house key, so that I can put it into the 
key hole to unlock the door, so that I can get into my house.’ This is indeed the thread of 
intentions  that  underlie  each  action  in  this  particular  situation,  but  they  are  all  implicit. 
Theory of mind permits unspoken yet mutual understanding. 
It is important to note that theory of mind can have socially positive, negative and/or 
neutral influences (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). In older children, insight into mental states can 
have  both  positive  and  negative  social  outcomes  such  as  enhanced  connectedness  and 
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capacity for communication as well as forms of bullying that require a certain level of insight 
(Hughes & Leekam, 2004). For example, like manipulation, theory of mind is integral to the 
ability to lie. Lying, despite any qualifiers we might attach to it, requires a fairly advanced 
understanding of the difference between reality and an intentional misrepresentation of it that 
will likely mislead another person. The key to understanding theory of mind in the context of 
lying is not how successfully a child can manipulate reality. We know from their pretend play 
very early on in life that they are quite capable of doing this. What is important is that the 
child has manipulated reality in such a tailored way that they expect their lie to be convincing 
to another person with another mind (Frye & Moore, 1991). 
Likewise, pro- and antisocial behaviors can also promote theory of mind themselves. 
As the ability to conceive of another’s perspective is instrumental in both pro- and antisocial 
interaction so can pro- and antisocial behaviors contribute to the development of theory of 
mind:  “both  empathy  and  malicious  teasing  are  associated  with  age-related  increases  in 
toddler’s awareness of internal states” (Hughes & Leekam, 2004, p. 607).
Theory of mind is a helpful tool used to decipher the world in which we live. As 
adults, we may take this understanding for granted; we may not even be aware of its presence 
in  our  daily  lives.  For  toddlers,  it  is  less  clear  how  available  this  awareness  is.  The 
interpersonal behavior of children seems to suggest that, in general, young children’s social 
intelligence differs from that of older children and adults. The idea that young children seem 
less likely, or less able, to conceive of perspectives other than their own and thus adjust their 
behavior accordingly, suggests that there is something to be developed, nurtured, facilitated 
or acquired that ultimately underlies all social interaction and interpersonal understanding. It 
is an exploration into the unseen, inner workings of basic human sociability.
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2.4 Roots of Theory of Mind
Given the age at which children begin to comprehend and succeed at standard false-
belief tasks, the historically accepted view was that a coherent theory of mind emerged in 
four  to  five  year  old  children  (see:  Astington,  1991;  De  Bruin,  2014;  Saracho,  2014a). 
Suggestions  about  the  earliest  signs  of  theory  of  mind  in  infancy  point  to  a  variety  of 
domains within cognitive and social  development.  “Some show that  an understanding of 
mental states is innate” (Saracho, 2014a, p. 9), that the beginning of an infant’s life marks the 
beginning of its development and that some basic interpersonal understanding is implicit. 
Some cross-cultural research takes an evolutionary stance and points to the potential adaptive 
qualities  of  false-belief  understanding that  emerge early on in development as a form of 
psychological reasoning (Barrett, et al., 2013).
Indeed, the dominant view in the literature on theory of mind is that infants have the 
ability  to  comprehend  mental  states  (Ruffman  and  Taumoepeau,  2014).  However,  the 
assessment procedures and results used to support this belief can be interpreted differently. 
Some researchers argue that early “signs” of theory of mind or perspective sharing could just 
as  easily  be  interpreted  as  pattern  and  behavior  recognition  (Ruffman  and  Taumoepeau, 
2014). Conversely, developmental psychologists who are convinced of this ability in infants 
claim that non-verbal activities like imitation and sharing affect are examples of the infant 
capacity to understand mental states (Gopnik, 2010). 
Imitation
Imitation in infancy is often regarded as grounding evidence for mental awareness. 
Some go so far as to suggest that it is the basis of infant empathic predispositions: “…for 
 23
babies imitation is both a symptom of innate empathy and a tool to extend and elaborate that 
empathy” (Gopnik, 2010, p. 206). Although imitation is also criticized as rote mimicry, some 
research  provides  contrasting  evidence  that  imitation  and  observational  learning  may 
contribute in some way to a child’s developing understanding of “shared meaning” (Hay et 
al., 1991). A study by Hay, Stimson & Castle suggests that behavioral imitation is mutually 
meaningful for the child and the person (adult) that he is imitating. Not only is it mutually 
meaningful, but imitation is also inseparable from the intentions and desires of both the child 
and the adult (Hay et al., 1991). Moreover, this awareness of shared meaning is promoted by 
opportunities  to  imitate  and  learn  observationally.  Although  their  study  could  not  define 
direct  consequences  on  the  construction  of  theory  of  mind  specifically,  it  illuminates  a 
“meeting of minds in the conative realm between thought, feeling and action” (Hay et al., 
1991, p. 136).
Intentionality
Another domain that has been suggested as evidence for infant theory of mind that 
may precede false-belief comprehension is intentionality (Meltzoff,  2000).  It  is  clear that 
infants share in emotional states and are able to recognize behavioral patterns fairly early on 
in life (Dunn, 1991), but the connection between these abilities and a more complex insight 
into  mental  states  is  less  clear.  Recognizing  behavior  as  intentional  is  regarded  as  an 
important milestone in laying the groundwork for a child’s social development (Hughes & 
Leekam, 2004). Thus intention in infancy is one area of development that has been strongly 
linked with the development of theory of mind (Frye, 1991; Meltzoff, 2000). Indeed some 
define theory of mind as the ability to understand others as “intentional agents” (Origgi, 
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2015). Frye’s argument for this relationship stems from the notion that recognizing intention 
seems to demand more insight than simply recognizing behavioral patterns and thus is a 
prerequisite for theory of mind (Frye, 1991). He suggests that this occurs around the time that 
a  child  is  eight  months  old,  when  social  and  cognitive  abilities  begin  to  become 
differentiated. This crucial differentiation refers to the child’s budding ability to distinguish 
people  from objects  and the  different  behaviors  that  each of  them evoke -  biological  or 
mechanical. Piaget recognized similar behavior in his work on children’s conceptions of the 
spatial and social realms. 
As adults, we know that one must act differently toward a person versus an object, 
but research and observation show that this is not immediately understood. Frye found that 
while ten-month-old babies made this behavioral distinction, three-month-old babies did not. 
Piaget made a similar observation of changes in children’s experiences of the world during 
the sensorimotor period (Doyle,  1987).  The children that  he observed to be making this 
differentiation were roughly the same age as the children that Frye observed. Piaget called 
this  fundamental  shift  in  experience  the  Copernican Revolution,  during  which  children’s 
knowledge  about  the  social  and  physical  worlds  and  their  relationships  to  those  realms 
evolves (Doyle, 1987). The direct implications for children’s abilities to understand other 
perspectives derive from this differentiation of the spatial and social worlds itself because 
taking another’s perspective requires social knowledge that cannot be explained by the laws 
of the physical world. Frye suggests that perhaps it is intention that permits this eventual 
qualitative  differentiation  in  behavior  (Frye,  1991)  because  intention  implies  a  mental 
existence  that  informs  future  behavior.  What  is  less  clear  is  how  much  an  infant’s 
understanding  of  their  own  intentions  towards  objects  and  people  determines  their 
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understanding  of  these  same tendencies  in  others  and,  importantly,  not  in  objects  (Frye, 
1991).  Nevertheless,  their  awareness  of  their  own  intentions  at  least  offers  a  chance  to 
recognize them in others (Frye, 1991). It is a watershed moment when the child is able to 
conceive of others as ‘selves’ (Bretherton, 1991). 
Meltzoff (2000) would agree that intention is a likely spring from which theory of 
mind flows. His findings show that at eighteen months this essential differentiation between 
person and object seems to exist (Meltzoff, 2000). This is in line with both Piaget and Frye’s 
prior findings. Children seem to be able to infer intention from the actions of a human being 
specifically but do not always attribute the same intention to an inanimate device even when 
it mimicked the action of a human being (Meltzoff, 2000). Perhaps there are “limits of the 
types of entities that are interpreted within this framework” (Meltzoff, 2000, p. 165). In other 
words, it seems that at eighteen months babies reserve attributions of intention exclusively 
for people. This could be the foundation for a “theory of mind module” (Meltzoff, 2000) — a 
tendency to engage with human beings within a different framework than that within which 
we engage with objects.
If evidence of theory of mind springs from behaviors in infancy, then what are the 
subsequent agents of its development? According to research, these agents are parts of the 
social domains of a child’s life. In these domains, the child is exposed to the reality of other 
minds and, later, has the opportunity to discuss them. The following section discusses some 
of these potential agents of development.
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2.5  A Developing Theory of Mind
However the roots of theory of mind are conceptualized, it is clear that mental insight 
evolves over time and with experience. Research has shown that many, if not most, of the 
significant experiences that cultivate theory of mind seem to be, perhaps not surprisingly, 
very social in nature. Again, the roles that different social elements play in this development 
are reported differently in the literature. There are theories that place varying weight on the 
roles of attachment, social interaction within family systems, language and play.
Attachment
Generations  of  research  in  attachment  theory  emphasize  the  importance  of  a 
caregiver -child  relationship  and  secure  attachment  in  virtually  all  areas  of  a  child’s 5
development.  Socio-cognitive  development  is  no exception.  The links  between theory of 
mind and caregiver sensitivity and emotional availability have been a telling area of recent 
inquiry (Licata et al., 2016). The direct consequences of the caregiver-child relationship on 
theory  of  mind  are  quite  clear.  These  researchers  argue  that  caretaker  sensitivity  is 
instrumental in bolstering the child’s ability to recognize and interpret mental and emotional 
states (Licata et al., 2016). Moreover, research has reported a direct lineage from maternal 
sensitivity, warmth and secure attachment to the child’s theory of mind later in life (Licata et 
al., 2016). 
Social-emotional  and  socio-cognitive  development  are  enhanced  by  a  strongly 
sensitive and emotionally available caretaker (Licata et al., 2016; Hughes & Leekam, 2004). 
 Indeed, the role of ‘caregiver’ has historically been synonymous with the mother, but the word 5
caregiver will be used in this discussion to represent primary caretakers that certainly include but are 
not limited to the mother. 
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The social, emotional and cognitive abilities later in life that are linked to earlier attachment 
and  caregiver  sensitivity  include  emotion  recognition,  false-belief  comprehension, 
understanding goals and intentions, and empathy (Licata et al., 2016). Therefore, although 
the  amount  of  research  in  this  specific  domain  is  not  significant,  the  importance  of  the 
attachment relationship to the development of  theory of  mind is  strongly emphasized by 
some (see: Hughes & Leekam, 2004). The evidence for these assumptions derives from the 
reported outcomes of an emotionally consistent and engaged caretaker. Licata et al. (2016) 
argue that the emotional availability of the caretaker affords the child three significant things: 
(1) Acknowledgment by way of the mother’s reflection of the child’s own mental states; (2) 
Consistency  between  the  mother’s  affect  and  the  actual  emotions  that  underlie  it,  thus 
allowing the child to correctly connect behavior with mental states; (3) Freedom to revel in 
the security of a stable and consistent caretaker and thereby have the emotional capacity to 
focus on others. 
These  findings,  however,  are  punctuated  by  the  child’s  own  characteristics.  The 
relationship between a child’s temperament and their own attachment to their caregiver is 
also  significant.  That  is  to  say  that  taking  temperament  into  account  as  well  as  its 
implications on the quality of their early attachment could explain individual differences in 
the age at which children understand false belief (Licata et al.,  2016). While it  has been 
reported that a mother’s sensitive and warm interactions towards her baby have influence on 
the later development of theory of mind, what needs more research is the extent to which the 
mutuality of their relationship affects the developing insight. This mutuality is defined by a 
connection consisting of both the mother’s and the baby’s demeanor and interactions. Given 
how enmeshed the emotional sensitivity of the mother usually is in the child’s own emotional 
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feedback, this group of researchers expected and reported a correlative relationship between 
the emotional availability of the child and their own development of theory of mind. The 
emotional connection was beneficial to the child’s mental-state understanding (Licata et al., 
2016). The findings suggest that although the caregiver's warmth and sensitivity is valuable 
and necessary,  the better  indicator in later developments in theory of mind is  the dyadic 
connection  between  caregiver  and  child.  Moreover,  early  interaction  proved  to  be  more 
significant  than  later  interaction  in  the  development  of  social  cognition,  serving  as  the 
bedrock of theory of mind. 
Family Systems
Theory of mind is ultimately a social matter. It follows, then, that its development 
might be most significantly fostered in social modes. Observations of children in families 
make evident how in tune young children are to others, particularly within their close family 
systems (Dunn, 1991; Licata et  al.,  2016; Perner,  Ruffman & Leekam, 1994).  Dunn and 
others shed light on an inconsistency in the theory that young children are limited in their 
understanding  of  others  given  their  overwhelming  ability  to  function  within  the  social 
ecology of a family (Dunn, 1991). Likewise, the family system itself plays an important role 
in the development of mental insight (Hughes & Leekam, 2004; Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 
1994). A large family and particularly one with siblings has been positively correlated with 
false-belief  understanding in three to four year olds (Perner,  Ruffman & Leekam, 1994). 
Together, these statements suggest that children have more interpersonal insight at a younger 
age and that the social environment plays a decisive role in the development of this insight. It 
is a two-way street. 
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Given Dunn’s observations, it is clear that two-year-olds recognize and respond to the 
emotional  states  of  family  members.  The  second  and  third  years  of  life  are  particularly 
generative in terms of acquiring insight into feeling states and intentions (Dunn, 1991). Not 
only do they recognize emotion states, namely distress, but they also seem to be curious 
about the causes of those emotions (Dunn, 1991). Dunn also suggests considering the role of 
familiarity of person and context in a child’s ability to understand a person’s mental state. 
Perhaps  there  are  different  degrees  of  awareness  for  intimate  family  members  versus 
hypothetical others that usually dominate research of false-belief comprehension. How much 
do children,  or even adults,  need to know about a person before they can truly attribute 
mental states to them? Among other variables, Dunn proposes that the emotional context of 
the family and the events that occur within them, such as disputes and family discourse about 
others, might contribute to developing theories of mind.
Social  systems  like  the  nuclear  family  both  nurture  theory  of  mind  and  provide 
opportunities  for  children  to  employ  it.  The  familial  context  is  particularly  important  to 
consider given the emotional investment of the child in it. Studies show just how invested 
children are in matters, namely disputes, that are particularly relevant to them (Dunn, 1991). 
This research highlights the relationship between emotionally-charged exchanges and social 
intelligence. Results showed that situations of arousal did not seem to be incompatible with 
children’s  learning.  On  the  contrary,  these  emotions  seemed  to  contribute  somehow  as 
children appeared to exhibit their most “mature” social behavior in disputes over their own 
rights and interests (Dunn, 1991). Indeed, in disagreement social intelligence becomes an 
increasingly important skill.
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[T]here  may  well  be  special  significance  in  the  emotion-laden  exchanges  in  the 
family — exchanges in which it is clearly of great importance for the child to learn 
how others will behave and think. (Dunn, 1991, p. 111)
Disputes with others inherently involve the diverging interests of at least two people, creating 
potential opportunities for the child to be exposed to differing points of view. Moreover, the 
fact that these situations are emotionally salient to the child might mean that they will be 
more likely to apply their  intelligence (Dunn, 1991).  Generally,  for young children these 
kinds of interactions occur most often in the home and between intimate family members. 
Cooperative  situations  between  older  and  younger  siblings  are  also  formative 
moments and are positively correlated with false belief understanding in younger siblings 
(Dunn, 1991). Thus, these moments of conflict and cooperation prove to be crucial in the 
child’s developing understanding of other people. Not only are they forced to grapple with 
the opinions of others as distinct from or even as similar to their own, but also this usually 
entails  some  explicit  discourse  about  opinion,  intention,  desire  and  belief.  Thus,  family 
discourse about the intentions of others is also potentially significant to a developing theory 
of mind (Dunn, 1991). Dunn suggests that these kinds of conversations that distinguish the 
mental states of one person from another support the child’s own developing theory of mind 
longitudinally.
Likewise, Dunn’s observations of jokes and shared humorous experiences as well as 
moments of teasing suggest a sensitivity on the part of the young child to others’ mental 
states.  Humorous exchanges suggest  that  a child must have some idea of what the other 
person will find funny, and ‘successful’ sibling teasing requires the young child to predict 
what would rile their sibling up.
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Although theory of mind is often regarded as congruent with age and maturation, a 
theory that  emphasizes  the  child’s  environment  and social  systems adjusts  the  emphasis. 
Instead, emphasis is placed on social and environmental factors, like family size and cultural 
and familial background, as responsible for the rate at which theory of mind develops and 
evolves. This approach also highlights the child’s own effects on their environment and the 
significance  of  the  interactive  role  a  child  plays  in  their  own  development  (Hughes  & 
Leekam, 2004).
Language
Like the exchanges between a child and their environment, the relationship between a 
child and their budding linguistic capabilities is seen as a significantly formative one. Among 
other social and cognitive variables that have been explored, language emerges as having one 
of the most significant relationships to theory of mind and false-belief comprehension. For 
children, language bears weight on the complexity of their mental insight (Saracho, 2014a; 
Milligan et  al.,  2007).  Not  that  insight  into mental  states  exists  only in  the company of 
acquired language,  but  rather  language affords  perspective  sharing the  potential  to  reach 
more complex levels (Milligan et al., 2007). With the acquisition of language comes a more 
complex way of categorizing and describing phenomena, namely mental ones. As individuals 
mature, insight into our own and therefore others’ emotional states, desires, opinions and 
beliefs will be attached to and expressed with words (Saracho, 2014a). Importantly, these 
words may or may not be verbalized but they are words nonetheless (Saracho, 2014a). They 
are  common  symbols  that  contribute  to  mutual  understanding  and  to  the  ability  to 
communicate effectively with other people. Indeed the general consensus is that language 
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and  theory  of  mind  are  interactive.  However  while  both  have  a  hand  in  the  other’s 
development, language seems to have a stronger influence over the development of theory of 
mind than the reverse (Milligan et al., 2007).
With that said, these findings can be interpreted quite differently. Some argue that 
language is correlated with theory of mind because it affords the child certain receptive and 
expressive capabilities that allow them to understand the words that they hear and to describe 
what they are thinking. Consequently, this has been one of the major arguments for language 
as a barrier to the successful distillation of information from false-belief tasks with young 
children (Meltzoff, 2000). This, however, implies that false-belief tasks are effectively verbal 
tasks and may be a misleading way to evaluate theory of mind (Milligan et al., 2007). As the 
acquisition of language often occurs steadily alongside age, it has been used to indicate the 
point at which a child will be successful on a false-belief task and thus possess a coherent 
theory of mind. Other studies propose that age might not necessarily be a determining factor 
given some inconsistencies in age and success on the task. In reality, children have been 
known to succeed at false-belief tasks at three, or in the case of this thesis 2 years 11 months, 
or for the first time at five (Milligan et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, some believe that the properties of linguistics are not significant 
and that language is indicative of certain conceptual developments in consciousness. In their 
meta-analysis of 104 studies evaluating the correlation between language and false-belief 
understanding,  Milligan  et  al.  (2007)  propose  that  an  understanding  of  false  belief  is 
undeniably connected to language but is not consistently dependent on the same linguistic 
abilities. This is evidenced by inconsistent results from studies emphasizing the relationships 
between  specific  linguistic  areas,  like  vocabulary,  semantics  or  syntax,  and  false-belief 
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comprehension (Milligan et al., 2007). As the findings were varied and contradictory across 
studies, it is unclear how requisite mastery of certain linguistic systems actually are for the 
development of theory of mind or false-belief comprehension. 
What seems to be a more relevant explanation for the relationship between language 
and theory of mind is how linguistic capabilities are indicative of conceptual capabilities. As 
language  develops  so  does  familiarity  with  “mental  terms”  like  “think,”  “believe”  and 
“remember.”  As  these  terms  are  imbued  with  meaning,  it  permits  a  growing  conceptual 
understanding  of  the  representational  lives  of  human  beings  and  the  ability  to  socially 
interact based on this understanding (Milligan et al., 2007). This goes beyond pure linguistic 
ability  because  the  child  must  be  able  to  use  terms  that  describe  mental  positions 
meaningfully (Milligan et al., 2007). Thus, this is indicative of a conceptual and linguistic 
shift that takes place sometime in the preschool-age years (Milligan, et al., 2007). It is not 
enough for the child to be able to say the word “think” — a feat of vocabulary — for they 
must  also know that  when they use this  word,  they are recognizing and evoking unseen 
mental processes that govern what people say and do. 
Play
Play is another domain in which theory of mind skills and false-belief comprehension 
develop. There is plenty of convincing research and theory that proves the multifaceted value 
of  play  in  the  lives  of  children.  These  studies  suggest  that  play  promotes  a  variety  of 
developmental  domains  such  as  language  development,  literacy,  social  skills,  meaning 
making,  social-emotional  development,  emotion-regulation,  impulse  control,  motor  skills, 
creativity, other cognitive functions and learning in general. Theory of mind and false-belief 
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comprehension are certainly part of this and theorists from different theoretical backgrounds 
consider pretense to be a precondition for false belief. 
Pretend play affords children direct experiences with pretense and role play that seem 
to invoke the same skills used in understanding mental states (Lillard, 1993). Ultimately, 
Lillard’s study concluded that although children’s behavior in play might seem to indicate 
that they are aware of the mental basis of pretend realities, there was not enough evidence to 
support it. It is possible that in pretend play, children can understand how to play “as if” they 
were someone or something else without recognizing the fact that those alternate existences 
are based in mental realities (Lillard, 1993). Nevertheless, “as if” play is a noteworthy part of 
the  process  towards  false-belief  understanding  in  particular.  “Belief  and  pretense  are 
conceptually  very  closely  related  because  both  lead  to  acting-as-if”  (Perner,  Ruffman & 
Leekam,  1994,  p.  1236).  Veena  Das  also  alludes  to  this  significance  and  intersection  of 
conceptual skills:
The significance of play lies in the fact that it enables the child to take the voice of 
the other. It is when the child learns to assume the viewpoint of other people through 
role playing. (Das, 1989, p. 280)
Pretend  play  in  particular  is  a  prime  example  of  how  a  child  must  be  able  to 
accommodate multiple realities simultaneously — both the real and the pretend (Vygotsky, 
1978). Theory of mind requires a similar flexibility in thinking (Sussman, 2012). This seems 
especially  applicable  to  false-belief,  as  it  also  requires  the  accommodation  of  multiple 
realities, that is, the diverging realities of the self and the other.
Perhaps  the  most  relevant  areas  of  development  that  play  promotes  are  socially 
oriented. Like interactions with siblings and other family members, pretend play with other 
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children provides opportunities for them to agree and/or disagree and thereby reconcile the 
existence  of  different  perspectives.  Play  encourages  children  to  consider  other  points  of 
views and to negotiate them (Sussman, 2012). Play with other children functions much like 
interactions within the familial context because it naturally requires children to interact with 
people that have distinct mental lives governing their behaviors, desires, and emotions. Like 
play with  siblings,  play  with  other  children is  an  example  of  a  cooperative  activity  and 
perhaps  one  of  the  most  intensive  social  situations  that  toddlers  are  exposed to  (Perner, 
Ruffman & Leekam, 1994). 
Play, like attachment, family systems and language, is important to consider because 
it is an example of a domain in which theory of mind is both employed and cultivated. It is a 
genuine example of  the child’s  active and participatory role  in  a  creative context  that  is 
exceedingly specific and important to children. Indeed, “pretend play is perhaps our best 
candidate for a cooperative activity which furthers the eventual understanding of false belief” 
(Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994, p. 1236)
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3. False Belief Task and Naturalistic Observations
3.1 Methods
In light of the preceding sections, the following chapter presents an authentic false-
belief  task.  It  is  in  part  a  nod to  research that  questions  the  potentially  decisive role  of 
language in tasks like these, as well as to the significance of this watershed moment in the 
development of theory of mind. Additionally, naturalistic observations of these children in 
the  same  setting  offer  different  interpretations  of  their  awareness  and  perspective-taking 
abilities despite or perhaps in complement to their task results. Thus, in order to encompass 
more  comprehensibly  the  range  of  engagement  with  mental  states  in  the  classroom,  the 
following study is comprised of these two distinct parts. Together, they ultimately create a 
more holistic image of theory of mind and false-belief comprehension in this group of two-
and-a-half-year-olds.
Table 1: Children’s Ages - Afternoon Two’s Class










The task that I carried out was an adaptation of a standard false-belief task. While this 
task  is  generally  reserved  for  older  children,  I  simplified  the  language  and  adapted  the 
procedures in an attempt to make it more relevant to the two-and-a-half-year-old child. A 
standard  false  belief  task  requires  a  child  to  consider  the  perspective  of  a  late-arriving 
bystander.  This  bystander enters  a  situation in which the child has privileged knowledge 
about something that will ultimately defy the bystander’s expectation. In this case, I used a 
bandaid box filled with rocks. Before seeing the alternative contents (i.e. rocks), one would 
likely assume that the band-aid box was filled with bandaids, thus creating a false belief or 
defied expectation.
The  group  of  participants  was  originally  comprised  of  all  eight  children  in  the 
afternoon Two’s program  at the Early Childhood Center (see Table 1 for ages). Although at 6
the beginning of this study there were eight participants, for a variety of reasons, one child 
was no longer able to participate in the task and therefore the final number of participants is 
seven. All seven children participated voluntarily, and no one was forced to participate. 
The first step of the task was to obtain oral consent. Upon obtaining oral consent from 
each child, the first questions I posed confirmed that the child indeed knew what bandaids 
 Given the uniqueness of this particular program, a brief description of it will be contextually 6
beneficial to the reader who is not familiar with it. The purpose of this particular Two’s Program is to 
invite children and their parents to experience school together for the first time and to facilitate 
healthy parent-child separation at a pivotal moment in the child’s development. The geographical 
space is divided into the “classroom” and the “parent room.”  At the beginning of the year, both 
parent and child are in the classroom together until they are ready for the parent to move into the 
“parent room” down the hall. The children are able to move freely between rooms and interact with 
their parents on their own terms whenever they need or desire to. Naturally, the needs of the children 
fluctuate daily and generally over the course of the year, and there is great variation in how much 
children flow between the rooms. Some children do not leave the classroom for the duration of class 
and others flow between the rooms consistently. 
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and the bandaid box were. Then I asked them what they thought was inside of the box. I had 
loose bandaids to show the child and to ignite a bit of conversation about them. After the 
child’s statement about what they believed to be inside the box, I opened the box to reveal 
that it was, surprisingly, filled with rocks instead of bandaids. Then, I asked the child what 
was actually inside the box to confirm their knowledge of both rocks and the actual contents 
of the bandaid box. Finally, I closed the box and asked the child what I will call the “pivotal 
question,” that is, what they thought one of their late-arriving classmates would think was in 
the box given the fact that they had not seen the whole demonstration (e.g. Now, there’s Sally 
over there; what is Sally going to think is in the box?). I also presented an image of the late-
arriving classmate while asking the pivotal question in order to provide more visual context 
for  the  participant.  The  choice  to  invoke  a  classmate  versus  a  hypothetical  other  was 
intentional  given  Dunn’s  suggestion  that  familiarity  might  play  a  part  in  the  ability  to 
attribute mental states. Parents were considered to fulfill this role but were ultimately not 
utilized out of concern that the emotional tie to the parent, or perception of parent as all-
knowing, would somehow muddy the responses. 
In an attempt to account for the variation in linguistic ability, I offered two images for 
the child to point to in response to the pivotal question — one of a box of bandaids filled with 
bandaids and the other of a box of bandaids filled with rocks. The idea was for the child to 
have the option to either point to an image or to express their thoughts verbally. After hearing 
or seeing their prediction of the late-arriving bystander’s perspective, I asked the child why 
they thought what they did in order to get a better sense of the mental operations that led 
them to their answer.
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Each interaction lasted a few minutes and children were free to refuse to respond or 
ignore me if they wished to. Children’s real names were not used, nor was the information 
recorded indicative of any individual children by name. Responses were recorded directly 
after each individual task and after the child had returned to another classroom activity. 
Naturalistic Observations
The purpose of including naturalistic observations in addition to a false-belief task is 
multifold. Although I attempted to adapt the task to be more accessible to a child under the 
age of three, I did not assume that it would be foolproof and thus I included descriptions of 
quotidian interactions that occurred in the classroom.
My observations focused on any episode of the children’s interpersonal interactions, 
attributions of mental and physical states to other people or fictional characters (i.e. dolls and 
characters in books),  and instances that might signify a conception of false belief.  These 
observations included attributions of desires, beliefs and/or opinions that either did or did not 
diverge from the child’s own, moments of deception,  and shared humor.  I  also observed 
numerous instances of inquiry into children’s intentions (e.g. ‘Why is she doing that?’) and 
moments of deception (e.g. ‘I am going to hide this here so that he won’t find it!’), as well as 
sympathetic  tendencies,  empathetic  behavior  and  intersubjective  understanding  between 
peers. These latter behaviors were exemplified by children’s reactions to and awareness of 
other  children’s  emotions  (i.e.  sadness,  pain  and  frustration).  Most  of  these  instances 
occurred in moments of emotional distress, harking back to Dunn’s suggestion that children 
of this age become increasingly sensitive to these kinds of emotions. In these situations, I 
also made note of the mental or behavioral terms that the children used to describe each 
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other, for example ‘the child is crying’ versus ‘the child is sad.’ The difference in qualifiers 
that  children  choose  shows  just  how varied  the  attributions  are  that  young  children  are 
making to other people.
Observations took place twice a week for two hours each in the same afternoon Two’s 
class. The eight children ranged between the ages of 24-36 months over the course of the 
academic year (September 2017 — May 2018). Two initially significant variables — age and 
setting — made this group especially fascinating given the novelty of the social situation and 
the children’s varying linguistic levels. Most of these children were experiencing school and 
socializing in a group of numerous children for the first time, and language, an important tool 
in relaying experiences, beliefs and desires to others, was vastly diverse among the eight 
children.
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3.2 Results and Discussion
False-Belief Task
Table 2: Children’s Responses to the Pivotal Question
More than half of the children in the study answered incorrectly (rocks), one child 
answered correctly (bandaids), and two of the children were unable to complete the task  in 
its  entirety  for  varying  reasons.  Although  the  purpose  of  conducting  this  study  in  the 
classroom and choosing classmates to be the late-arriving bystanders was to provide some 
familiar framework, this did not seem to me to make the children more likely to correctly 
attribute false belief. Moreover, I found the images to be a distraction rather than a helpful 
aid. In light of the research by Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon (2016) the images might have been 
better incorporated into the task by allowing the children to practice using them before the 
actual task. Although the children liked looking at them, it seems that it was necessary to 
introduce how I  intended for  them to be used.  The majority of  the children had enough 
language  to  verbally  express  their  thoughts,  thus  interaction  with  the  images  usually 
dissolved into labeling of the objects in them. 






Child 6 Bandaids 
Child 7 Rocks
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The children’s results could exemplify several things depending on the theoretical 
lens  applied.  The results  could be typical  of  children whose theory of  mind has not  yet 
reached  the  level  of  false-belief  comprehension  or  whose  linguistic  abilities  created 
limitations surrounding the language and/or conceptual understanding of the task. From a 
processing-demands perspective,  the task may not have reduced the demands of the task 
enough and  thus  the  child’s  inhibitory  limitations  interfered  with  their  ability  to  answer 
correctly. As we have gathered from the literature, there is great variability in theoretical 
explanations as well as in general in children’s lives. Therefore, the same explanation may 
not be applicable to all  six children that did not succeed on the task.  For some children 
language did indeed seem to be a convincing barrier, for others it was attention. For others 
still the barrier seemed to be conceptual as was the nature of the context in which false-belief 
comprehension  was  being  invoked.  In  other  words,  perhaps  access  to  false-belief 
understanding fluctuates depending on the context, which in this case was either a contrived 
task or a spontaneous, observed play scenario.
For the purpose of discussion, I have chosen to focus on four of the seven children. 
The  choice  to  include  these  four  was  based  on  how their  task  results  exemplify  certain 
phenomena that have been previously discussed or how the circumstances of their task defied 
my own expectations.
Child 1, 2:6
This  child  could  not  participate  for  the  full  length  of  the  task  due  to  external 
distractions, such as other activities and toys. I attempted the task twice with this child, and 
both times was only able to get through the first part of it, that is, before asking the pivotal 
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question. This child also has the least amount of language of all the students. His language 
consists mostly of one- or two-word statements. During the first attempt, the child simply 
walked away after seeing what was inside the box. When he came back, I proceeded to ask 
him the question using the visual aids. He pointed immediately to the image of the box of 
bandaids filled with bandaids and then immediately afterwards to the image of the box filled 
with rocks and said “rocks.” My interpretation of this is that this child pointed to the box 
filled with bandaids out of recognition and then pointed at the rocks for the same reason but 
was simply connecting the word ‘rocks’ to the image of rocks. 
During the second trial, the child wanted to see what was inside the box immediately, 
and when I began to ask the pivotal question, the child pointed at the closed box and said 
“bandaids” then got distracted by a basket of cars nearby and walked away. My interpretation 
of both of our interactions together is that this child was likely naming recognizable objects 
and that his attention was divided. This might have been expected, however, in a classroom 
filled with other tantalizing things that are certainly competition for attention.
Child 4, 2:6 
This child agreed to answer some questions about the bandaid box, but as soon as I 
started to ask about them, the child became very anxious and kept repeating: “no boo boos; I 
don’t have any booboos.” I tried to clarify to him that I was aware that he did not have any 
injuries and that the bandaids were just for fun, but he could not let go of the expectations 
linked to the sight of bandaids. This was not a barrier that I anticipated running into, but is 
helpful to note for future research. It is an example of a child’s potential inability to separate 
an object from a very specific meaning or experience and the emotionally-charged fog that 
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can cloud one’s ability to attend to a task. It is not surprising that this was a reaction to 
bandaids, as they are usually employed when the child is injured and is potentially distressed. 
Perhaps I was not clear enough about the fact that I was not assuming the child had an injury, 
but it seemed that as soon as he saw the bandaids, his mind was set on rejecting them. In the 
future, I would offer another set of materials as an option for a child who is uncomfortable 
engaging with bandaids. 
Child 5, 2:7
Child  5  represents  the  majority  of  children  that  answered  “rocks.”  This  child 
thoroughly enjoyed the task and was very interested in playing with the bandaids, namely 
opening them and taking them out of the encasing. This child enthusiastically answered by 
saying “rocks” after  being posed the pivotal  question.  When I  asked this  child  why she 
thought this, she responded “because it’s silly!” 
This response can be interpreted several different ways. The word ‘silly’ is the same 
one that I used when describing the “silliness” of the bandaid box filled with rocks. From a 
linguistic point of view, the child could have simply misunderstood the language and used 
my qualification about the box full of rocks to explain the other classmate’s hypothetical 
reasoning. Other, cognitive interpretations of this are possible. If in fact the child does not yet 
have a theory of mind that would allow her to conceive of another’s perspective, then it could 
be argued that this child still attributes her own view of the world to others. Piaget would 
have described these results in terms of egocentrism.   The children who answered rocks said 
so  because  at  this  time in  their  lives  children  attribute  their  experience  of  the  world  to 
everyone else. The children’s follow up responses might also support this notion, such as the 
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responses of Children 3 and 4. Their reasonings were, “because he knows there are rocks in 
there” and “because he likes them” respectively. Both of these responses could be seen as 
deriving from the children’s own knowledge and feelings about the rocks in the box. 
Child 6, 2:11
After  being  posed  the  pivotal  question  about  the  knowledge  of  the  late-arriving 
bystander, this child answered confidently and enthusiastically, “band-aids!” Although it was 
not part of my task, she insisted that we show the late-arriving classmate the contents of the 
box to witness the reaction. When we did, the classmate reacted with excitement and Child 6 
rejoiced in the fact that the bystander’s expectation had been defied. This is impressive given 
the literature that suggests that this task is only successful with children over a certain age. It 
was especially interesting given the fact that at the end of the task she insisted on following 
through with  the  hypothetical  situation to  experience  the  classmate’s  reaction.  The other 
children in the study returned to play when the task had been completed. 
Moreover, this child’s unique capacity for play that involves pretense and role-taking 
further  validates  her  result  with  evidence  of  her  perspective-taking  abilities  outside  the 
domain of this task. As we have seen, there are several reasons why role-taking in play is a 
fascinating phenomenon. The reason that it is so relevant to theory of mind and to this child 
is that it clearly exemplifies her ability and propensity to conceive of, and even to actively 
embody, another person’s perspective.
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Child 7, 3:0
This child’s response to the pivotal question was “rocks,” although I hypothesized 
that this child would answer correctly given his age and linguistic capability. When I asked 
him why he thought this, his responses seemed to evade the heart of my question: “I’m going 
to take [the rocks] out to show [her]. I’m going to take them out and line them up so that 
[she] and me can count them together.” Then, he began to take the rocks out of the box one 
by one and line them up on the floor in a long column. Any further inquiry from me was 
effectively ignored.
Children 6 and 7 are the two most advanced speakers in the class. While I do not 
know much about their home lives firsthand, I know that they are both only children and 
spend  much  of  their  time  out  of  school  with  their  mothers.  I  can  assume  from  their 
interactions  with  their  parents  at  school  that  the  children  are  viewed  as  partners  in 
conversation and in play with at least their mothers. Although I hypothesized that both would 
succeed on the false-belief task based on their abilities in other areas, only Child 6 did. Child 
6 is a few days younger, does not usually leave the room to play with her mother during class 
and occasionally engages with other children. She usually plays alone, but is not ruffled by 
the unsolicited curiosity of other two-year-olds. On the other hand, Child 7 is consistently 
removed from the group and makes clear that he wishes to be removed by choosing secluded 
places to play. He is possessive of toys and often wishes to leave the room to play with his 
mother — his preferred playmate. Given Child 6 and 7’s similarly advanced language skills, 
linguistic ability cannot account for their differing task results. Although I might have agreed 
with the theory that standard false-belief tasks might actually be more evaluative of linguistic 
abilities than cognitive ones, after conducting research of my own and looking at the results 
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from two children of almost the same age with similar linguistic capabilities, I am not so 
sure. Language is certainly part of it, but exactly how is less clear, and these two task results 
make this evident. 
Naturalistic Observations
Observation A
Participants: Child 2 (2:5), Teacher
Child 2, who has taken to playing with baby dolls, pulls one out of the crib. 
Child 2: “Is the baby hungry?” He brings the baby to the teacher and asks her if the 
baby is hungry. 
Teacher: “You want to know if the baby is hungry?” 
Child 2: “Yes.”
He moves away and begins feeding the baby. He lines up several babies on the table 
and hovers over one of the babies with a toy bottle, feeding it. 
Child 2: “Their tummies rumble.” He repeats this to himself several times.
In this  observation,  Child 2 attributes a mental  state — hunger —  to a physical 
indicator — rumbling tummies. What we do not know, however, is what operation the child 
is employing to make this claim. Is it a function of theory of mind? While the answer is 
decidedly ambiguous without more comprehensive insight into this child’s thought processes, 
the child is making behavioral inferences. 
As Piaget originally suggested, there can be a way of inferencing that is egocentric. 
The narrative connected to this is something along the lines of ‘How would I feel if I myself 
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were in this situation?’ This is a generally familiar narrative even for adults. In this case, self-
insight helps inform the insight that we have into the mind and behavior of another person. 
This is not to be confused with a similar but different narrative: ‘How would I feel if I were 
that person,’ which is what a simulation theory suggests. In this case, instead of using self-
knowledge  to  gather  information  about  others,  knowledge  about  the  other  is  directly 
employed. In light of this, it is possible that this child is using his own knowledge from past 
experiences with hunger. Making a claim about the baby with the rumbling tummy would be 
based on how he himself would feel if his own tummy were rumbling. Apparently, he would 
feel hungry. 
This  same  operational  pattern  is  evident  in  his  attribution  of  feeling  states  to 
characters in books that we read. He consistently comments on a certain smiling butterfly at 
the end of Bornstein’s Little Gorilla (2014): “The butterfly is smiling because everyone is 
singing “Happy Birthday”!” Then the child points to the smirking gorilla beside the butterfly: 
“He’s happy too.” Child 2 attributes happiness to the butterfly and the gorilla because they 
are smiling and because they are being serenaded by their friends on their birthday. We can 
infer  from his  claims  that  he  believes  that  people  feel  happy  when  others  sing  “Happy 
Birthday” to them and that smiling indicates happiness. 
Whether this information derives from his own personal experience or whether he is 
using the behavior of smiling as an indication that the animals are enjoying themselves is, 
again, ambiguous. Yet, despite the operation used to make inferences about the ‘internal state’ 
of the baby doll or the butterfly, he is making a connection between an observable behavior 
and attributing it  to an unseen feeling state.  This could be reason enough to believe that 
though he many not yet understand false belief, he understands that mental states underlie 
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expressive phenomena like rumbling tummies and smiling. As we have seen, this ability to 
assign  emotion  states  to  expressions  is  a  prerequisite  for  more  complex  inferencing 
capabilities. Another observation with the same child further elucidates this.
Observation B
Participants: Child 2 (2:5)
Child 2 brings a book to the teacher to read called The Feelings Book . The cover is 7
compartmentalized into four sections each featuring a face displaying a different emotion 
(see image 1.1. below). We sit down to read the book and he points to each of the faces 
starting with the face in the square on the bottom right: “This is a mad face; this is a sad face; 
this is a loud face; this is a happy face.”
Image 18
Here, the child clearly recognizes and points out affective states on the book cover — 
a fledgling instance of cognitive empathy. He uses this ability to attribute feeling states to 
 Parr, T.  (2000). The Feelings Book. New York: Little, Brown and Company. 7
 Ibid.8
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facial expressions, an important prerequisite for a more complex awareness of differentiated 
internal states later on. Like Dunn suggests, the ability to recognize emotional states may 
precede the ability to recognize other mental states. It is an important operational milestone. 
The ability to make a claim about another’s feelings based on their expressions is inherently 
part of the trajectory because of how intertwined theory of mind and cognitive empathy are 
(Hodges and Myers, 2007). 
Recognizing  another’s  diverging  feeling  state  immediately  differentiates  the  child 
from the other who is feeling differently. Affect and facial expressions are important facets of 
social knowledge when we are able to recognize them and ultimately make inferences from 
them. They are powerful referencing agents in social situations and can and will inform how 
we intend to interact with another person. This kind of recognition can be applied to virtually 
all  areas  of  interpersonal  exchange.  It  requires  a  child  to  make  the  connection  between 
external  behavior  and  internal  states  and  adds  to  the  child’s  growing  database  of  social 
information. More social information allows for more complex inferences. It is important to 
consider how his behavior is a relevant part of the process and even more so a necessary 
piece of the theory of mind puzzle. This becomes more blatantly clear if we consider a child 
who is not able to recognize emotions and facial expressions in a book or elsewhere in the 
environment.
Observation C
Participants: Child 7 (3:0), Teacher
Child 7 is playing on the reading rug with a collection of toy cars and a wooden 
garage. I am sitting on the rug near him, and he turns to me.
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Child 7: “I need someone to play with me.”
Teacher: “Do you want to ask if another child would like to play with you?”
Child 7: “It needs to be a teacher.”
Teacher: “Would you like me to play with you?”
Child 7: “Yes!”
Based on previous experience with this child, it was immediately clear to me that 
when he said he needed someone to play with, he was implying that he wanted me to play 
with him. This is an observation of the manipulative function of theory of mind. We had been 
playing together earlier that day, and in suggesting that he needed a play partner that was 
specifically a teacher, he seemed to have a certain goal in mind that he was not explicitly 
stating. He constructed a dialogue that made offering myself to be the play partner a very 
logical response. For whatever reason, he wanted me to offer to play as opposed to asking me 
explicitly and thus successfully fabricated a situation in which he could essentially make me 
do  that.  This  required  him to  presume  a  certain  train  of  thought  on  my  part.  However 
consciously or subconsciously the process was for him, he seems to have employed a theory 
of mind process to do this. I believe that he anticipated that I would offer to play in response 
to his first  declaration of need. When I did not,  instead of asking me outright,  he added 
another stipulation that narrowed my response options and made offering myself the most 
convenient and compatible with his request. The other options would have been to involve 
another teacher or to decline his request altogether, neither of which were likely to happen. 
Other naturalistic observations of this child’s behavior in the classroom support my 
belief that this process was driven by theory of mind. For example, he has a tendency to hide 
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toys from other children and when doing so, says that he is hiding a certain toy somewhere 
where another child will not be able to find it. If simply looking at this child’s unsuccessful 
task results, one would not have attributed false-belief comprehension to him. However, his 
tendency to conceal toys from other children suggests otherwise. In these hiding situations, 
he has privileged knowledge about where the toy is  concealed,  much like the privileged 
knowledge in  the  false-belief  task.  He clearly  understands  that  when he moves  a  toy to 
another spot, there is crucial information that the other child is not privy to and will therefore 
be unsuccessful if they try to look for the toy in its original spot. Other standard false-belief 
tasks like Change in Location employ this very kind of awareness (Saracho, 2014b; Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983). Perhaps Dunn’s observations of children’s notably “mature” behavior in 
disputes or emotionally vivid situations apply here. We might consider the notion that his 
awareness of false belief could be present in some situations and not others. In these hiding 
situations, he is anxious about other children taking the toys he wants to use. It seems that the 
child might be better able to employ an understanding of false belief in a situation in which 
he is emotionally invested, even though this understanding did not seem available to him 
during the task (Dunn, 1991).
Discussion of Task and Observations Results
While there is some variation in the results presented here, the implication is that 
children under the age of three are less likely to comprehend a verbal false belief task. The 
task results illuminate an overwhelming inability to succeed on a false-belief task at this age. 
However, what many of these results do not represent is an awareness of mental states that 
has not yet  reached the threshold of false-belief  comprehension or at  least  some kind of 
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linguistic expression of it. Yet, the task results of this group of children do not explain the 
very same children’s daily behavior. This suggests that they have an awareness of mental and 
emotional states that is not represented by the task results. 
The  children  seem to  be  already  aware  of  and  engaging  with  mental  states  and 
perhaps even some subconscious understanding of false belief. In the spirit of being aware of 
the  limitations  of  naturalistic  observations,  I  turn  to  Frye  and Moore:  “they  are  at  least 
suggestive of sensitivity on the part  of the young preschooler to the existence of mental 
life” (1991, p. 7). After all, some research has shown that three-year-olds are likely to choose 
“mental descriptions” versus behavioral ones when describing images (Meltzoff, 2000). One 
would describe an image of a bunny looking down at the ice cream that dropped on the floor 
in one of two ways. One will either say something akin to ‘the bunny is [sad] about dropping 
the ice cream’ — emphasis on an emotional state — or ‘the bunny is looking at the ice cream 
on the floor’ — emphasis on a behavior.  Meltzoff suggests that three-year-olds will  tend 
toward the former. Indeed, from what I observed, the quality of the descriptions children used 
to talk about people and situations are consistent with his claim. This makes the task results 
seem misaligned with the apparent awareness of perspective characteristic of the children in 
the classroom context outside of the task. In light of the combined results, the question that 
begs  to  be  asked is,  if  young children do have some possession of  theory  of  mind and 
comprehension of false belief at a young age, then why might children fail on a verbal false-
belief task like this one?
The observations could be indicative of varying degrees of mental insight that evolve 
over  time  and  development.  Similar  to  the  ideas  of  Frye  and  Moore,  Jean  Briggs’ 
interpretation of the different kinds of human awareness might provide some explanation.
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I assume that any person “knows” in a variety of modes —that is, experiences 
different kinds of awareness;  that  awareness constitutes a continuum and so may 
exist  in different degrees; and that awareness fluctuates,  so that a person may be 
distinctly aware of a motive, an emotion, a wish in one mode or at one moment in 
time and less aware, or not aware at all, in a different mode or at another moment. 
(Briggs, 1998, p.16) 
The  idea  that  awareness  fluctuates  or  exists  on  a  sort  of  spectrum and  depends  on  the 
variables of a particular moment in time might be helpful. This paradigm provides another 
possible explanation for the variation in success on implicit and verbal false-belief tasks with 
young children. It would require one to assume the notion that theory of mind and false-
belief  comprehension do not  activate in all  perspective-taking situations at  the flick of  a 
switch.  They  do  not  appear  at  some  precise  point  in  development,  but  rather  become 
increasingly applicable and available to more and more life situations as a child goes through 
life.
Similarly,  De  Bruin  (2014)  suggests  that  these  kinds  of  tasks  only  account  for 
conscious theory of mind mechanisms but that these processes are only accessible to the 
children subconsciously. This would make it  difficult,  indeed impossible,  for the child to 
apply language to what they are not consciously processing. This is a possible explanation 
for  the  perplexing  task  results  of  Children  6  and  7  who  both  seem  to  have  some 
comprehension of false belief but who clearly are capable of expressing this awareness in 
different contexts. Indeed, what is perhaps most intriguing about this study is the difference 
in participant results, namely those of Children 6 and 7.
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Child 7 seems to exhibit an understanding of false belief in the classroom when the 
integrity of his toys, exclusive play space and other play needs are particularly vulnerable. 
This  vulnerability  is  hard  to  avoid  in  a  room full  of  two-year-olds.  For  him,  these  are 
significant emotionally-charged instances, which could activate the child’s more “mature” 
intelligence, as Dunn suggests, but on a level that might not be available to the child in all 
situations.  Alternatively,  unlike  play,  the  task  presents  a  situation  that  is  completely 
hypothetical and removed from the immediate context of the present classroom activity or 
real-time social situation like the ones Dunn and Winner described. Perhaps the accessibility 
of false-belief is tied to his personal emotional investment, the immediacy of the situation, 
and the risk that is involved. This would imply that his emotional investment on the false-
belief task was relatively low. It did not invoke his need to stake a claim to toys nor his 
tendency to conceal the whereabouts of those toys from the other children. Moreover, I (a 
teacher)  was leading the exchange,  which,  while making it  more impersonal,  could have 
added to the implicit ‘safety’ of the situation, and thus might not have sparked the need to 
employ this kind of social intelligence. The context of play might also be worth considering 
as  play  is  a  common  language  and  familiar  setting  for  these  children.  Perhaps  his 
understating of false belief was able to be translated in a playful context and not through that 
of the contrived task. 
I  also  do  not  think  that  the  diverging  social  tendencies  of  Child  6  and  7  are 
coincidental and therefore should not be overlooked. As the development of theory of mind 
and false belief seem to flourish in social settings — within family systems, interpersonal 
discourse  about  mental  states,  linguistic  exchanges  in  general  and  play  —  their  social 
behavior might be, at least in part, a focal point for understanding their perspective. 
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Indeed, the results of the two children’s tasks are likely the product of more than one 
variable and are, perhaps most importantly, inseparable from what the child him- and herself 
brings  to  their  interactions  with  the  world.  It  is  highly  possible  that  there  is  a  marked 
difference in these children’s opportunities for explicit discourse about mental states using 
mentalistic  terms.  It  is  also  possible  to  consider  the  significance  of  family  size,  genetic 
influence,  social  tendencies,  language,  personality  and  temperament,  all  of  which  are 
variables that have been suggested throughout the literature as integral to the development of 
theory of mind and false-belief comprehension in young children.
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4. Conclusion
Exploring the roots and developmental trajectory of theory of mind in young children 
grounds our understanding of human sociability in the long run. Whether children arrive in 
the  world  with  certain  predispositions  to  conceive  of  other  perspectives  or  not,  the 
development and cultivation of these capabilities equip people with a powerful social tool. 
Research that focuses on the connection between theory of mind, false-belief understanding 
and sociability later in life convincingly emphasizes the need to pay special attention to this 
area of social and cognitive development.
The definition and theoretical lens that are used to consider theory of mind in young 
children change the way that we understand its existence. While false belief has been the 
historical marker of a child’s coherent possession of theory of mind, it seems that verbal tasks 
like these only scratch the surface of what and perhaps more importantly how children are 
conceiving of the internal states of other people. This is exemplified in my own findings and 
in the findings of others whose research emphasizes other areas of child development to 
support these claims. Research in imitation, intentionality, sharing affect and joint attention 
point to the potential roots of theory of mind in infancy and other tasks suggest fledgling 
false-belief understanding in children significantly younger than three. Even daily naturalistic 
observations like the ones included here enrich what we know about theory of mind and false 
belief in a way that contrived tasks might not be able to.
Despite its origins, it is clear that theory of mind evolves over time and development. 
It  has  the  potential  to  become  more  complex  and  more  insightful  as  information  about 
people’s thinking increases. With this complexity comes an increasing mutuality between a 
child and their social world. As the child begins to understand more about mental states, 
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theirs and those of others, they are able to make more complex social inferences, engage in 
and  understand  more  nuanced  social  behaviors  and  even  alter  behavior  based  on  these 
understandings (e.g. Frye 1991; Meltzoff, 2000; Michlmayer, 2002;). What we know about 
the beginnings of theory of mind is bound to the things that feed its progression. Several 
major agents that nourish its development are attachment, family systems, discourse about 
internal states, language and cooperative pretend play. It is not coincidental that each of these 
represents  one of  many diverse  social  domains  that  require  the  child  to  be in  tune with 
another  individual.  These  situations  are  opportunities  for  children  to  fine-tune  their 
interpretive skills. Those skills in turn contribute to more complex abilities, both pro and 
anti-social in nature. While the capacity to share, predict, manipulate, infer or comprehend 
mental  states  does  not  have inherent  positive  or  negative  social  impact,  this  intelligence 
allows human beings to achieve both sorts of goals. The ability to have insight into another’s 
mental state using theory of mind is both predictive of prosocial skills in peer interaction 
(Peterson et al., 2016), and linked to intelligent forms of bullying (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). 
Therefore, theory of mind is a necessary but insufficient variable in the road to behavior that 
is prosocial and, simply, kind. Otherwise stated, “Empathy grounds morality, but morality 
goes beyond empathy” (Gopnik, 2010, p. 210). This gets at the heart of the different forms of 
empathic responses and the social moves available to those with access to more or less social 
information. 
Part of the value of exploring the nature of mental-state awareness in young children 
is in the consequent realization that children understand and are attuned to more than they are 
usually given credit for. What we might find is that their processes of revealing all that they 
are capable of is not readily accessible to adults who no longer remember their mental lives 
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as infants or toddlers. Indeed the call for novel task procedures is not new, but it is important 
to emphasize. We should not underestimate what we can learn from the mental lives of young 
children, for they will be older children, adolescents, teenagers and adults equipped with a 
mental insight deriving from early-life experiences and the power to act on those insights. 
Indeed the deeper I dove into this work, the less convinced I was that the adult ability to infer 
mental states was that much more coherent than the young child’s. Passing observations on 
subway platforms, street corners, in grocery lines and train cars made it clear to me that while 
adults may solidly understand that mental lives underlie behavior, the inferences that they 
make  and  behavior  they  exhibit  based  on  those  insights  are  anything  but  consistent  or 
consistently  accurate.  We are  prone  to  misread,  misattribute,  and  misunderstand  and  the 
tendency to apply our own “privileged” information to others is  not at  all  lost  with age. 
Keeping this and the ideas presented in this thesis in mind, may we deeply consider our 
abilities to be in-tune with one another and seek to better understand the power of our own 
perspectives and the utterly distinct perspectives of others. 
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